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ABSTRACT:
The early post-independence periods saw Africa have efficient Public Sector Institutions. Over a decade,
there seems to be a decadent in the public sector. The study examines the regional analysis of government
effectiveness in Africa. The study uses data given by the World Bank's Governance Indicator from 55 African
countries from 2002 to 2018. The study uses Panel Regression Analysis Model of Random Effects and
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares to assess government effectiveness in the five regions of Africa. The findings
indicate that Southern African countries performed best as compared to its counterpart regions, followed by
North Africa. However, East, West and Central African countries had low scores on government
effectiveness. The results imply that electoral politics and political interference hurt the performances of
public institutions on the continent.
Keywords: Electoral Politics, Public Sector, Government Effectiveness, Southern Africa, North Africa, East
Africa, West Africa, Central Africa
INTRODUCTION
The early post-independence period saw Africa have efficient Public Sector Institutions (Gyimah-Boadi &
Mensah, 2003). In recent times, there seem to be a decadent in the sector due to the kind of political system
run in most countries on the continent. The World Bank (2019) contends that government effectiveness
captures perceptions of the quality of public service, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The quest for measuring the performances or
effectiveness of government by researchers and policy analysts in public management, public administration
and public policy increased with universally adopted reforms in the last quarter-century (Ingraham &
Moynihan, 2000). These reforms centred on bettering government effectiveness and enhancing public
institutions (Whitford & Lee, 2012). In light of this, recent studies focus on government performances or
effectiveness. In most developing countries, especially countries on the African continents, the sentiments of
political parties under the whims and caprices politicians control public institutions. Appiah and Abdulai
(2017) describe the political system run in various developing countries as “political clientelism”. Political
'clientelism' is where political parties that are privy to the term of office they have would manage the public
institutions and resources abysmally. The Human Development Report, 1997 asserts that efforts have been
instituted by post-independence governments to ensure that the imbalances and inefficiencies in the Public
Sector breached is amended (Kwasi-Ofosu, 2012).
Stevens and Teggemann (2004) argue that the first wave of reforms in the Public Sector came immediately
after the independence of many African countries. The indigenes replaced colonial masters who headed
these public institutions. Besides, the colonial masters trained the earliest staff who replaced them. Also,
vacant public service positions were merit-based and not on political appointments. It suggested that
payment of salaries was on technical skills. Public institutions eliminated the class structures to ensure sanity
in the system. It invigorated the moral standards in the public sector and serving in public offices also became
a privilege to those who were appointed to such portfolios to serve with alacrity and integrity. However, the
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function and efficacy of the Public Sector have become very weak and prone to political aversion.
Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh, (1999); Gyimah-Boadi and Mensah, (2003) contend that the position that has
led to the dwindling performance of Public Sector capacity is due to central government sole distribution of
resources, the appointment of high public positions by a sole state actor and centralization of political power
in many African countries. Appiah and Abdulai (2017) attributed this poor performance to lack of political
parties' willingness to continue reforms when there is a change in government. Despite the many strands of
literature on government effectiveness, analysis based on regions on the continent on government
effectiveness and the role of electoral politics on public services is little. Therefore, this paper tends to fill the
gap. The paper also tends to ascertain which region's governments have been more effective in terms of
independence of their public and civil service from political pressures, interference and electoral politics.
The study organizes the paper as follows: the next section presents the literature review and methodology.
The following section presents the results and discussion of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Role of Electoral Politics in Africa
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) define public sector as general
government and public corporations, including the central bank (OECD, 2004). The United Nations also
defines it as general government, public corporations and not-for-profit institutions owned by the state
(Apreda, 2003). Moreover, the International Federation of Accountants defines the public sector as national
governments, regional governments, local governments and related governmental entities (Pina & Torres,
2003). Further, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines Public Sector as general government (central
government, state/ provincial/ regional governments and local government) and Public Corporations
(Financial corporations and non-financial corporations) (Audet, 2003).
Electoral politics in Africa inclined to partisan politics has its roots after independence (Asante & GyimahBoadi, 2004) which is one of the causative factors to government effectiveness on the continent. While some
public institutions are making giant strides in government effectiveness, others still wallow in weak
government effectiveness on the continent. For instance, World Bank (2019) asserts that countries like
Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius Tunisia, South Africa and Namibia have somewhat strong government
effectiveness as compared to the rest of the countries on the continent. However, in countries like Ghana,
Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Togo, government effectiveness tend to be weakly attributed to the
politicization of public institutions (Saul, 2001).
Solingen (2012) argues that the ushering in of electoral politics in advanced countries has helped introduce
social-political union, ideological solidarity, and national advancement at a deliberate pace proportionate
with bureaucracy. However, electoral politics in developing countries centres on ethnocentric, and
appointment of positions into public institutions have become partisan and ethnical, making the institutions
ineffective. Harvey (2007) connotes that the advantages from the activity of this order for the most part or
somewhat disproportionately, accrue to the ruling party, funders of political parties and grassroots
supporters. Hence their bid to make sure their political parties stay in power and as well maintain their
positions in the Public Sectors to mismanage the public sector and continue in its inefficiency unabatedly.
Government effectiveness captures the degree of independence of public and civil service from political
pressures (Sacks & Levi, 2010). Less government effectiveness portrays a public service dominated by
political pressures which have led to the poor performances in the Public Sector (Frempong and Aryee, 2001)
and the decline of government effectiveness. For instance, Ghana's multiparty system has relentlessly
collapsed the participatory approach in the public sector (Harnack et al., 2000). Newly elected governments
discontinue projects of previous governments. Besides, appointments are on party faithful committed to
implementing the agenda of the party disregarding individuals' competencies and special abilities.
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Moreover, political parties' concentration on the next elections and how to manoeuvre its way to win the next
elections has also become a contributor to public sector performances. The study argues that countries with
high levels of political interference and electoral politics have weak government effectiveness. Specifically,
the paper contends that the low performances in public institutions are due to the funding of political parties
(Austin and Tjernstrom, 2003), spoil system of governments (Wantu, 2017), corruption (Montinola and
Jackman, 2002; Montes and Paschaol, 2016) and centralization of political power (Hindriks & Lockwood,
2004).
METHODOLOGY
Sources of Data
The study uses datasets from 2002 to 2018 sourced from the World Bank's Governance Indicator, covering 55
African countries on government effectiveness (where -2.5 is weak, and 2.5 is strong). Additionally, this
paper determines the average government effectiveness of individual countries over the 16 years. The study
also shows the trends in government effectiveness across the five regions (Southern Africa, North Africa,
East Africa, West Africa and Central Africa).
Economic Model
The research uses Panel Regression Analysis Model of Random Effects and Ordinary Least Squares to assess
government effectiveness in the five regions of Africa. The study aims to carry out a regional comparison of
government effectiveness in terms of political interference and electoral politics on public services in Africa.
Therefore, the model of the Panel Regression Model will be as follows:
Eqn……..1

G_Eit = a0 + B1 R_Oit + Eit

Where:
G_E = Government Effectiveness (Political Interference and Electoral Politics on Public Services)
R_O = Regional Output
a0 = Constant
B1= Co-efficient
u= Between entity error
E= Within entity error
Dependent Variable
The World Bank (2019) defines government effectiveness as perceptions of the quality of public service, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. In
effect, government effectiveness, as discussed in this study, is political interference and the role of electoral
politics on the public services of Africa.
Independent Variable
The independent variable is regional output where regional output means Southern Africa, North Africa, East
Africa, West Africa and Central Africa. It is on this wise that the regional comparison will be on: to know
which of the region's public sector is less of political influence, interference and electoral politics.
RESULTS
The data discusses the government effectiveness using OLS and Random Regression and Trends of
government effectiveness of the five regions in Africa (North Africa, Southern Africa, East Africa, West
Africa and Central Africa) to ascertain the independence of public and civil service from political pressures,
interferences and electoral politics.
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Time-invariant
Time-invariant variables like country code and region have positive between variation and zero within
variation. However, G_E has more between variations (0.58) than within variation (0.17). The average G_E
of individual countries ranged between -1.62 and 0.81 across countries but varied over the 16 years for each
country over time.
Table 1: Time Invariant
Variable
Code

Variation
overall
between
within

Year

Mean

St.

Min

Max

26.5

15.01736
15.15476
0

1
1
26.5

52
52
26.5

overall
between
within

2009.5

4.612545
0
4.612545

2002
2009.5
2002

2017
2009.5
2017

G_E

overall
between
within

-0.71959

0.59514
0.575452
0.170366

-1.89
-1.61563
-1.40834

1.05
0.806875
0.058534

R_O

overall
between
within

2.326923

1.205222
1.216249
0

0
0
2.326923

4
4
2.326923

G_E is Government Effectiveness, R_O is Region Output
Trends Of Government Effectiveness Across Five African Regions
Figure 1 below shows the trends of G_E across five African regions and overall. Over the 16 years, South
Africans recorded the highest G_E score, while the central Africans recorded the least G_E over the years.
G_E for the East and West African countries were approximately stable over the years while North Africans
recorded some drastic fall in G_E scores from 2010 till 2017 it starts to rise.

Fig 1: Trends in Government Effectiveness
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Random Effects And Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Results show that countries in the east, west and central Africa had lower G_E scores compared to the North
Africans. However, the South Africans recorded higher G_E score than the North Africans in all estimators.
While the regions were overall significantly, predictive of G_E (p<0.001) worked is significant for some
estimators and not for others. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects were
significant (P<0.001), indicating that random effect estimator is a better estimator than the OLS. 89% of the
variation was explained by country-specific term while the rest was due to idiosyncratic error.
Table 2: OLS and Random Effects Regression Analysis on Government Effectiveness
Pooled
OLS
regression
Region
North Africa
South Africa
East Africa
West Africa
Central Africa
P-value
R-sq:
R2-within
R2-between
R2-overall
Theta
Sigma u
Sigma e
Rho

ref
0.61(0.46 , 0.76)***
-0.05(-0.17 , 0.07)
-0.19(-0.31 , -0.07)**
-0.58(-0.72 , -0.45)***
<0.001
0.26

Between

Random
effects

ref
0.61(-0.01 , 1.22)
-0.05(-0.54 , 0.44)
-0.19(-0.68 , 0.29)
-0.58(-1.12 , -0.05)*
0.0028

ref
0.61(0.01 , 1.21)*
-0.05(-0.52 , 0.43)
-0.19(-0.67 , 0.28)
-0.58(-1.11 , -0.06)*
0.0008

0.00
0.29
0.26

0.00
0.29
0.26
0.91
0.50
0.18
0.89

Discussion Of Findings
The results indicate that South African countries performed better than all the regions, followed by North
African countries. East, West and Central African countries had lower scores on government effectiveness in
that order. The findings suggest that there are less political interference and electoral politics in the public
institutions of Southern African countries and North African countries than the rest of the regions. Reilley
(2002) corroborates that electoral politics and political interference plays a vital role in public institutions.
After elections, it becomes winner takes all, and the government appoints its followers and loyalist to occupy
such portfolios to take decisions for public institutions thereby creating a massive dent in the performance of
these public institutions (Philips, 2009). The reasons for the variations are funding of political parties (Farrel
and Web, 2000; De Miguel, 2011; Gyampo, 2015), educational and training capacities (Mitlin, 2008; Levin,
2009), corruption (Mbako, 2000; Boaffo-Aurthur, 2008; Abdulai, 2009).
Gyampo (2015) inclines that democratization led to the emergence of various political parties across Africa.
The formation of every political party in a country requires funds and public support to be successive in
various elections. De Miguel (2011) adds that political parties are as the bosses of government since they
perform development roles of government, preparing of leaders at the various levels of governance, and
holding governments responsible when out of power. However, regions on the continent having a low score
on government effectiveness advertently run parties as private organizations where individuals fund these
political parties for them to fuel them into power as compared to regions with better scores on government
effectiveness. Therefore, these parties who are explicitly sponsored by private financiers expect the party to
appoint them into public positions. In most cases, some of these financiers are not competent enough to
occupy these positions, thereby leading to inefficiencies.
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Levin (2009) asserts that in public service, the academic experience is essential to holding a public office in
most countries. A candidate with good academic background has the competencies and capabilities to hold
public offices. Comparatively Southern African and North African countries base recruitments on merit as
compared to the other regions. Employees in the regions with a low score on government effectiveness lack
the rudimental training to work in public institutions (Miltin, 2008). Besides, these bureaucrats have low
creative ability to innovate, leading to an inefficient performance in the various public sectors.
Mbaku (2000) argues that in some African countries, people hail corrupt public officials. A gradual
paradigm shift to the support of corrupt officials and hailing them as unsung heroes and heroines are
detrimental to the quality of public institutions. Boafo-Arthur (2008) further adds that ethnocentrism and
electoral politics drives corruption. Most of the people in different political parties would support their own
even if the act has a ramification on the economy of a country. Thus corruption has led to weak state capacity
of the public sector in some public institutions in other regions (East, West and Central African countries) on
the continent as compared to other regions (Southern and North African countries).
The dwindling performance of government effectiveness in the public sector is due to central government
sole distribution of resources, the appointment of high public positions by a sole state actor and centralization
of political power (Gyimah-Boadi & Daddieh, 1999; Gyimah-Boadi & Mensah, 2003).
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Conclusively, the findings of the study reveal that political interference and electoral politics plays a
significant role in the decline of the public sector in Africa. The decline is because of political parties privy to
the term of office they have, manage the public institutions and resources abysmally. In addition to the above
system, political interference contributes to the weak government effectiveness on the continent. Besides, the
institutionalization of the multi-party system is a contributing factor to this menace which usually has its
roots in political interference, lack of education and training, political parties funding and aftermath and
corruption.
The results indicate that Southern African countries performed best as compared to its counterpart regions,
followed by North Africa. However, East, West and Central African countries had low scores on government
effectiveness. The results imply that electoral politics and political interference hurt the performances of
public institutions on the continent.
In sum, countries must reconsider multi-party democratization as it breeds inefficiencies in public
institutions. Africa needs a clear and straightjacket distinction between policymaking and policy
implementation to ensure the smooth running of public offices. Thus in terms of appointments of public
officials and as long as enacted laws do not strengthen the positions of public officials and bureaucrats, Africa
will continue to have weak and ineffective governments. Further research should consider political finance
and how funding political parties affect government effectiveness in Africa.
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